This is not a Marxist blog. We
mostly cover liberal and Democratic Socialist movements, both at home and
abroad. The government in Venezuela is a democratic socialist government. That
is the kind of government we support here at The Idiot Factor. Further more we believe other countries have the
right to experiment with their own ideas, free from interference from super
powers as the US is. So we feel this article is entirely appropriate for this
blog. -SJ Otto
From Telesur:
By: Federico Fuentes
·
Venezuela has been rocked in recent weeks by almost
daily protests and counter-protests, as right-wing opponents of socialist
President Nicolas Maduro seek to bring down his government.
While the media portrays these events as a popular
rebellion against an "authoritarian" government, supporters of the
pro-poor Bolivarian revolution initiated by former president Hugo Chavez say
the country is witnessing an escalation in what is an ongoing
counter-revolutionary campaign seeking to restore Venezuela’s traditional
elites in power and reverse the gains made by the poor majority under Chavez
and Maduro.
Federico
Fuentes interviewed Steve Ellner, a well-known
analyst of Venezuelan and Latin American politics and a retired professor at
Venezuela’s Universidad de Oriente, to get his views on recent events.
When
it comes to the current turmoil in Venezuela, the media have been unanimous in
their version of events: the Maduro regime is on its last legs due to the
overwhelming opposition it faces from the people, including among the poorest
sectors that previously supported the government, and therefore its only
recourse for survival is violent repression. How accurate is this media
narrative?
It’s hardly a far-gone conclusion.
There is no better indication of the deceptiveness
of the mainstream media’s narrative than the spatial nature of the
anti-government protests in early 2014 known as the “guarimba” and again this
year.
The protests are centred in the middle and upper
class areas whose mayors belong to the opposition. The strategy behind the
protests is for the mass civil disobedience, confrontation with security forces
and widespread destruction of public property to spread to the poorer areas.
Certainly, the popular sectors have a long tradition
of street protests, particularly over deficient public services. But the
popular sectors have remained largely passive, although with more exceptions
now than in 2014. Obviously the opposition is banking on greater active popular
support than in 2014.
Along similar lines, the Chavista United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) has been more damaged by electoral abstention among
disenchanted Chavistas than those who end up voting for the opposition. Such
electoral behaviour is what explains the Chavista defeat in the December 2014
elections for the National Assembly.
But the Chavista leaders still have an impressive
degree of mobilisation capacity, as was demonstrated in two recent marches, one
on Venezuelan Independence Day on April 19, and the other on May 1.
The nation’s precarious economic situation as well
as the complete political turnaround in the hemisphere strengthens the opposition’s
hand. Whereas in past political crises, such as the coup attempt in 2002 and
the general strike of 2002-2003, the Chavez government was able to count on
backing from other Latin American nations including in some cases non-leftist
ones.
Now Venezuela’s neighbouring governments, in spite
of their considerable unpopularity and internal discontent, have explicitly
taken up the cause of the Venezuelan opposition.
But at this point I would describe the political
situation in Venezuela as a standoff, a far cry from saying that the government
is on its last legs. Of course, given the political volatility over the recent
past, predictions have to be at best tentative.
In an ultimate sense, the popular sectors have the
last word. If they were to join the protests, then the statement that the
Maduro government is, as you say, on its last legs, would be accurate. The
situation would then be similar to that of the Soviet Union in 1991 when the
miners began to march against the government, thus signalling the collapse of
the regime.
Even
some former supporters of the government today speak of an authoritarian turn
on the part of Maduro. Is there any truth to this accusation?
To answer your question it has to be pointed out
that Venezuela is not in a normal situation, with what political scientists
call a “loyal opposition” that recognises the government’s legitimacy and plays
by the rules of the game. Thus to talk about government actions without placing
them in context – as the corporate media is prone to do – is misleading.
The opposition leaders of today are, for the most
part, the same ones involved in the coup and general strike of 2002-2003, the
same ones who refused to recognise the legitimacy of the electoral processes in
2004 and 2005 and consistently questioned the legitimacy of the National
Electoral Council except in those cases in which the government was defeated.
They are also the same ones who refused to recognise
Maduro’s triumph in the presidential election of 2013, resulting in about a
dozen deaths, and then promoted the four months of protests in 2014 involving
civil disobedience on a massive scale along with considerable violence,
resulting in 43 deaths including six members of the national guard.
The current period commences with the opposition’s triumph
in the National Assembly elections of 2015 when the president of that body,
Henry Ramos Allup, immediately announced that regime change would be achieved
within six months; subsequently the National Assembly turned down the
executive’s budgetary allocations. All along the opposition has rejected the
government’s call for a national dialogue, demanding concessions as a
precondition for negotiations. The protests that have occurred in the last
month are a repeat of the guarimba of 2014. Opposition leaders completely evade
the issue of violence, other than declaring that they are opposed to it in an
abstract sense.
Practically every day they call marches in the
affluent eastern part of Caracas that attempt to reach the downtown area where
the presidential palace is located. Government spokespeople have stated
numerous times that downtown Caracas is off limits for the opposition marches;
security forces commonly employ tear gas to prevent passage.
The reason for the government’s refusal is obvious.
With a massive number of opposition people in the downtown area for an
indefinite period of time, massive civil disobedience, the surrounding of the
presidential palace and violence would all ensue, along with uncontrollable
chaos.
The confrontations would be aggravated by the
coverage of the international media, which has always spun their reports to
favour the opposition. The fact that every day for the last several weeks the
main leaders of the opposition have called for marches to reach downtown
Caracas, even though they know full well that confrontations will occur, would
suggest that their strategy for gaining power envisions street disruptions and
combat.
The spatial nature of the protests is key. You may
say that the government is justified in avoiding the protests from reaching the
centre of Caracas. But the question may be asked, would the Chavistas tolerate
peaceful marches originating from the affluent eastern half of the city
marching though Chavista strongholds in the popular sectors?
The question is clouded by the fact that the
opposition marches almost invariably involve civil disobedience and violence.
Would
you say that both the Chavistas and the opposition are assuming intransigent
positions?
Both sides are playing hard ball, but a description
of the political setting is indispensible in order to appreciate what is at
stake. The fact is that the democratic nature of some of the government’s
decisions is questionable, two in particular.
A month ago, ex-presidential candidate (on two
occasions), and governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles was
stripped of his right to participate in elections due to charges of corruption.
In the second place, the gubernatorial and municipal
elections which were slated for December 2016 have been delayed on grounds that
other proposed electoral processes have pushed them into the future. Although
Maduro has indicated that his party is ready to participate in those elections,
a date has still not been set. If elections were held today, the Chavistas
would very possibly suffer losses.
The hardliners in the Chavista movement headed by
National Assembly deputy Diosdado Cabello are obviously calling the shots and
they support an aggressive line toward the opposition. The most visible voice
for the “soft-line” is former vice-president Jose Vicente Rangel, who favours
gestures that would encourage negotiations and buttress those in the opposition
who reject street confrontation.
Likewise, the radicals in the opposition are firmly
in control. They have made clear that once in power, they would jail the
Chavista leaders on grounds of corruption and violation of human rights. Their
call for “No to Impunity” is a coded slogan. It means in effect a witch hunt
against the Chavista movement and repression that would pave the way for the
imposition of unpopular neoliberal policies.
Indeed, neoliberalism characterised Capriles’
platform in the two presidential elections of 2012 and 2013. There is a
definite relationship between the radical tactics and intolerance displayed by
the opposition, on the one hand, and the neoliberal program which would be
imposed should the opposition return to power, on the other hand.
To sum up, the narrative that calls the Maduro
government “authoritarian” is a blatant misrepresentation of what is happening.
On the other hand, the Chavista leaders have on occasion distanced themselves
from democratic principles. Their actions, however, need to be contextualised.
What
has been the impact of interference by the US government and the Organization
of American States, along with the changing attitude of certain governments in
the region?
The foreign actors you refer to have failed to place
themselves above Venezuela’s internal politics in order to promote a peaceful
resolution to a conflict that could well degenerate into civil war. The
statements issued by the White House as well as Luis Almagro, the OAS’
secretary general, coincide in their entirety with the opposition’s narrative
and demands.
Rather than taking sides in Venezuela’s internal
conflict, the OAS should have called for a national dialogue and named a
nonpartisan committee to investigate disputed events. The decision of the
Maduro government to withdraw from the OAS was a reaction to the organisation’s
partisanship, which has served only to exacerbate the political polarization.
The OAS and other international actors reinforce the
Venezuelan opposition’s narrative that conflates pressing economic problems and
the alleged authoritarianism of the Maduro government. This line inadvertently
strengthens the hand of the hardliners within the opposition.
The only way to justify regime change by
non-electoral means and the intervention of foreign actors, such as the OAS, is
to attempt to demonstrate that the nation is headed toward a dictatorship and
systematically violates human rights.
But the moderates within the opposition – although
at this point they have no visible national leader – favour emphasising
economic issues in order to reach out to the popular sectors of the population,
attract some of the disenchanted Chavistas, and at the same time accept
dialogue with government representatives. The moderates therefore place an
accent mark on economic issues more than political ones.
In this sense, the intromission of foreign actors
who question the Venezuelan government’s democratic credentials only serves to
bolster the position of the radicals in the opposition and to further polarise
the nation.
In
terms of the current economic problems: how serious are the shortages?
The problem of shortages of basic products is
undeniable, even while media outlets like the Wall Street Journal claim that the nation is on the verge
of mass starvation. Hunger is a scourge that afflicts the lower strata in
other, if not all, Latin American nations. But the key index from social and
political viewpoints is the contrast with standards in Venezuela in previous
years. The deterioration has certainly been sharp with regard to the period
prior to the sharp decline in oil prices in mid-2015.
What
do you foresee happening in the immediate future? Is the Maduro government
doomed? What do you think of the proposed Constituent Assembly?
Maduro’s proposal for a constituent assembly is a
mixed bag with regard to the possibility of achieving greater stability.
On the one hand it is an initiative – something new
– that is designed to break the deadlock the nation finds itself stuck in. A
favourable scenario would be that the Chavistas are able to activate their base
as well as that of social movements and achieve an important degree of electoral
participation.
Furthermore, in the best-case scenario, constituent
assembly delegates would formulate viable proposals to deal with pressing
issues, such as corruption, and the Chavistas in power would demonstrate
genuine receptivity to them. In short, a constituent assembly based on
bottom-up participation could be a game changer.
In the case of the alternative scenario, the
constituent assembly proposal will be viewed as a ploy to buy time and
sidetrack the electoral process.
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